Rethinking emotions and educational leadership

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The literature on emotions and educational leadership is in need of a viable conception of ‘emotions’. Recent studies of emotions and educational leadership have unwittingly inherited serious problems from current research on educational leadership and consequently misunderstand the political force of emotions. In this article we argue that a viable conception of emotions and educational leadership needs to understand emotions with two key conceptual shifts. First, emotions need to be understood as publicly and collaboratively formed, not as individual, private and autonomous psychological traits and states. Second, leadership needs to be seen as an enacted, emergent phenomenon rather than socially expressed or constructed. A sustainable and distributed model of educational leadership cannot be achieved without understanding how both feelings and leadership are ‘constituted and operate interactively at the level of both individual personal experience and wider social formations… [and] power relations’ (Harding and Pribram 2004: 863). This article summarizes recent research that has pioneered new space for emotions within educational leadership studies, and analyzes how this research could extend analyses to engage questions of power and cultural hierarchies that are embedded into cultural norms.

Introduction

rather than socially expressed or constructed. A sustainable (Hargreaves and Fink 2006) and distributed model of educational leadership (Foster and St Hilaire 2004) cannot be achieved without understanding how both feelings and leadership are ‘constituted and operate interactively at the level of both individual personal experience and wider social formations… [and] power relations’ (Harding and Pribram 2004: 863).

In this article we summarize recent research that has pioneered new space for emotions within educational leadership studies and analyse how this research could extend analyses to engage questions of power and cultural hierarchies that are embedded into cultural norms. Our conclusion suggests implications for research, policy and practice.

The social and organizational cultural dimension of emotions

Recent studies on emotions and educational leadership are following current directions in educational leadership research toward a social and organizational cultural approach. Current research on educational leadership is moving beyond a focus on leaders in specialized roles and towards seeing leadership as requiring multiple leaders and a distributed model of leadership (Yukl 1998, Heck and Hallinger 1999, Donaldson 2001, Gronn 2002, Hopkins 2002, Lambert and Walker 2002, Southworth 2002, Foster and St Hilaire 2004). Rosemary Foster and Brenda St Hilaire (2004) observed that ‘During the current period of accountability with increased emphasis on improving schooling, it is not surprising that researchers are looking beyond the principalship and investigating different perspectives of school leadership that are not role-bound’ (p. 355).

Some pioneers in the field of emotions and educational leadership are focusing on the social and organizational dimensions of emotions. These thinkers attempt to understand emotional experience in non-dualistic terms, in ways that do not separate emotion and reason or private and public (Boler 1997, 1998, 1999, 2004, Beatty 2000a, 2000b, 2002b, Beatty and Brew 2004, Hargreaves 2000, 2001, 2004, Zembylas and Boler 2002, Boler and Zembylas 2003, Garrison and O’Quinn 2004, Zembylas and Vrasidas 2004). While significant headway has been made, particularly through the work of Andy Hargreaves (2000, 2001, 2004, 2006 [with Fink]), Brenda Beatty (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002a, 2002b), David Loader (1997), Jill Blackmore (1996) and Arlie Hochschild (1983), emotions mistakenly and sometimes unwittingly are assumed to be ‘individual, internal, inherent and private’ (Harding and Pribram 2004: 864). Dualistic ways of thinking, talking and writing about emotion that universalize, essentialize and individualize emotion are embedded within our conceptual and linguistic efforts to overcome these binaries. The cultural and historical legacies that have dismissed or privatized emotion, depicted emotion as feminized weakness and excluded emotion from the rational political arenas continue to persist as an ever-present ghost of cultural disdain (Boler 1997).

Hargreaves’ (2004) and Beatty’s (Beatty 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b, Schmidt 2000, Beatty and Brew 2004) ground-breaking social and
organizational analysis of emotions provided a theoretical framework for much of the research into emotions and educational leadership. Hargreaves and Beatty recognized the cultural dimension of emotions as well as the individual’s emotional experience, a departure from the prevalent view of emotions solely through individualist and psychological terms (Hargreaves 2000, 2001, 2004).

Hargreaves (2000) explained that ‘Being tactful, caring or passionate as a teacher is treated [by the literature] as largely a matter of personal disposition, moral commitment or private virtue, rather than of how particular ways of organizing teaching shape teachers’ emotional experiences’ (p. 813). Hargreaves (2000) observed that ‘Organizations and workplaces are prime sites in which adults experience and learn to express their emotions in particular ways’ (p. 815).

Central to the organizational cultural dimension of emotions are Hargreaves’ two basic concepts of emotional understanding and emotional geographies. His measure of the quality of teaching, learning and educational leadership, and all human interactions for that matter, is the extent to which people develop emotional understanding. Emotional understanding is an intersubjective process requiring that one person enter into the field of experience of another and experience for herself the same or similar experiences experienced by another’ (Hargreaves 2001: 1059). Hargreaves (2000) explained that emotional understanding is not a linear, step-by-step, process, instead it occurs instantaneously as ‘people reach down into their past emotional experiences and “read” the emotional responses of those around them’ (p. 815). This ‘emotional scanning’ involves interpreting and unraveling the emotional experiences and responses of others (p. 815).

Emotional misunderstanding occurs when peoples’ ‘emotional scanning goes awry’ (Hargreaves 2000: 815) where they ‘mistake their feelings for the feelings of others’ (Denzin 1984: 134, as quoted in Hargreaves 2001: 1060) or when teachers stereotype students’ emotions (p. 1060). Hargreaves (2000) explained that ‘emotional engagement and understanding in schools (as elsewhere) require strong, continuous relationships between teachers and students so they learn to “read” each other over time’ (p. 815). Thus, emotional misunderstanding can lower the quality and standards of teaching. Hargreaves advocates creating conditions of teaching, school structures and priorities that make emotional understanding possible (p. 815).

Hargreaves’ central insight is to describe how emotional understanding and misunderstanding in education result from the characteristics of a social area, a shared community or space, which he termed emotional geographies. He described five emotional geographies of teacher–parent interactions—socio-cultural, moral, professional, physical and political—and their consequences. These consist of ‘the spatial and experiential patterns of closeness and/or distance in human interactions and relationships that help create, configure and color the feelings and emotions we experience about ourselves, our world and each other’ (Hargreaves 2001: 1061).

These five forms of emotional distance and closeness can threaten emotional understanding among teachers, students, colleagues and parents. In socio-cultural geographies differences of culture and class create emotional distance between people. Moral geographies are configured by
differing purposes that are ‘at odds with those they serve and where there are no mechanisms to discuss or resolve these differences’ (Hargreaves 2000: 816). Professional geographies create a distance between people by defining a “classical” masculine model of the professions... that is especially prejudicial to feminine, “caring” ethics of teaching’ (p. 816). In political geographies ‘hierarchical power relationships distort the emotional as well as cognitive aspects of communication between teachers and those around them’ (p. 816). In physical geographies the possibility of close and meaningful relationships between people is replaced by ‘fragmented, infrequent, formalized and episodic encounters’ (p. 816).

Beatty (2002a) applied Hargreaves’ concepts in an investigation of the emotions of leadership. She examined how teachers and leaders experience, express, reflect upon, understand and apply the emotionality of educational leadership. She focused on the organizational and personal influences on leaders’ experience of emotionality by exploring ‘the possibility and potential desirability of an integration of emotion and cognition through authentic self-leadership’ (p. 15). Beatty (2002b) concluded that the ways principals and teachers interrelate greatly affects the working lives of teachers and, correspondingly, the lives of their students (p. 2).

Hargreaves and Beatty’s interactionist view of emotions and educational leadership follows the move in educational leadership literature from an individualistic to an interpersonal and organizational cultural approach, seeing educational leadership as constructed through social interactions (Heck and Hallinger 1999, Foster and St Hilaire 2004). Emotions and leadership are seen as a ‘shared influence process’ (Foster and St Hilaire 2004). This view mistakenly sees organizational culture as simply an aggregate of individuals experiencing private and autonomous emotions without discussing ‘socialization... [as] a cultural act’ (Tierney 1997: 5). Hargreaves’ work unwittingly assumes a modernist view of organizational culture and emotional geographies as ‘aberrant and in need of repair’ (Tierney 1997: 3–4), endorsing what Tierney called ‘a rational view of the world in which reality is fixed and understandable, culture is discovered, and the individual holds an immutable identity that awaits organizational imprinting’ (p. 4). However, ‘culture is “up for grabs” or contestable... constraints exist by way of historical and social forces, but multiple possibilities exist to reinscribe culture with alternative interpretations and possibilities’ (p. 4).

In sum, educational researchers are beginning to see emotions as situated in social and organizational processes and dimensions (Hochschild 1983, Blackmore 1996, Loader 1997, Beatty 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002a, 2002b, Hargreaves 2000, 2001, 2004, Hargreaves and Fink 2006). These views, however, are founded on mistaken assumptions about how individuals and social settings interact and how emotions are formed. Unfortunately, emotions and social settings are understood as individual forces that act upon each other, rather than interact with each other.

At the core of Hargreaves’ and Beatty’s views is a particular conception of emotional experience that tries not to be dualistic, yet often unwittingly expresses itself in theory and practice in dualistic terms that unintentionally reinforce the very problems they are trying to solve. According to Hargreaves (2001) emotional understanding requires ‘the subjective interpretation of
another’s emotional experience from one’s own standpoint’ or ‘that one person enter into the field of experience of another and experience for herself the same or similar experiences experienced by another’ (p. 1059). The ‘shared and shareable emotionality’ (p. 1059) that is central to what it means to emotionally understand suggests emotional tourism, a visiting that requires emotional geographies in passport form. This form of emotional traveling requires a particular form of reading. Hargreaves (2000) explained that emotional understanding occurs instantaneously as ‘people reach down into their past emotional experiences and “read” the emotional responses of those around them’ (p. 815).

This interpreting and unraveling of the emotional experiences and responses of others (Hargreaves 2000: 815) brings to mind the ‘modes of easy identification and flattened historical sensibility’ represented by ‘passive empathy’ (Boler 1999: 157). But who and what, we wonder, benefits from this ‘emotional scanning’ (Hargreaves 2000: 815), and in what circumstances? Can we know the other’s experience? Who should feel empathy for whom? If no change can be measured as a result of the production of empathy, what has been gained other than a ‘good brotherly feeling’ on the part of the universal reader? (Boler 1999: 156–157). At stake is not only the ability to empathize with the very distant other, but to recognize oneself as implicated in the social forces that create the climate of obstacles the other must confront.

Hargreaves stated that emotional understanding is an intersubjective process, however, his narrow use of the concept emotional understanding suggests a weak sense of ‘inter’. The prefix ‘inter’ could be used in a weak sense to mean ‘between, among, or in the midst of’, suggesting that still existing boundaries are transcended, as in the words international and intertropical. The prefix ‘inter’ could be used in a wider sense to mean ‘mutual or reciprocal’, suggesting that boundaries disappear, as in the words interrelate and intermingle.

Research on emotions and educational leadership inherits a dualistic view of educational organizations. Current research on educational leadership favours a constructivist perspective that explores ‘How leadership unfolds within school settings as a shared, constructed phenomenon’ (Heck and Hallinger 1999: 356, as quoted in Foster and St Hilaire 2004: 355–356). An underlying assumption of this research agenda is the dichotomy between seeing educational organizations as ‘constructed realities as opposed to systems or structures that operate independently of the individuals in them’ (Foster and St Hilaire 2004: 356). As Baerveldt and Verheggen (1999) aptly observed, ‘the reality… in which we find ourselves… is… neither a world that exists independently from us, nor a socially shared way of representing such a prepiven world, but a world itself brought forth by our ways of communicating and our joint action’ (p. 185) (emphasis added).

Beatty’s research on emotions and educational leadership assumes a false dilemma inherited from the literature on educational leadership that organizations are either constructed or prepiven. Her approach, like Hargreaves’, assumes this dichotomy concerning emotions and educational leadership. Her view lends itself to risky conceptual and linguistic dualisms. Her approach to understanding emotions begins with the private emotional
experience of the individual, psychological self by asking educational leaders about their feelings: ‘Whole or fragmented, integrated or divided, the self is the starting point for understanding emotion’ (Beatty 2000a). She advocated, following Kelly (1955, 1963), ‘that everyone is capable of being her/his own psychologist, offering that if you want to know how someone thinks, ask him/her’ (Beatty 2000a: 16). This approach focuses on self-conceptions and emphasizes individualism, thereby failing to acknowledge the role of educational culture and institutional structure in forming feelings in teachers, learners and leaders.

Beatty (2000a) then attempted to overcome this methodological shortcoming by reintroducing social and cultural concerns through ‘mapping the emotional patterns in the organizational terrain’: ‘First we must explore how being a leader currently feels’ and ‘Then we may gain access to some otherwise inaccessible possibilities of what leadership can be’ (p. 15). She described the epistemological foundations of her study in a way that suggests that emotional experience could be seen as arising from the interaction of two separate realms, the private/personal and the social/organizational cultural. She explained that her study (Beatty 2000a) was located epistemologically ‘in a view of leadership processes which combines two theoretical paradigms. Through the social constructionist lens we see and map the emotional patterns in the organizational terrain’ and ‘probe… the inner emotional landscapes of educational leaders employing psychodynamic theoretical perspectives of the individual and organizational self. (p. 16).

Beatty’s approach can be understood to recommend that teachers and leaders attend to social and organizational cultural concerns about emotions and education ‘in addition to’, to borrow Evan Thompson’s (1995) phrasing, private, individual emotional experiences—implying that the two sorts of concerns belong to separate realms. In sum, we wish to underscore that to understand the teacher’s, leader’s and learner’s emotional experiences we have to reject terminology that promotes continued separation of emotional experience into separate private and public realms.

**Emotional understanding as collective witnessing**

Scholarship on emotions and educational leadership could be enhanced by turning to contemporary feminist philosophies of emotion. These most promising approaches to the study of emotion challenge the traditional separation of emotion and cognition by showing that emotions are neither private nor public, but rather must be understood as collaboratively formed.

Boler’s (1999) feminist analysis of emotion pushes beyond the universalizing tendency of discourses about emotion, to include our mutual responsibility to one another. She distinguishes between ‘passive empathy’ and ‘testimonial reading’ (pp. 155–174) and introduces a related distinction between ‘spectating’ and ‘collective witnessing’ (pp. 176–179).

Passive empathy, like Hargreaves’ notion of emotional understanding, implies a full identification with a very distant other and involves an uncritical acceptance of the value of ‘putting oneself in the other person’s shoes’. I take up your perspective and claim that I can know your experience
through mine. Emotional misunderstanding occurs, according to Hargreaves, when I fail to judge what is ‘really happening’ to others when ‘emotional scanning goes awry’ (Hargreaves 2000: 815).

Boler (1999) considered this uncritical reading of a fairly distant other, whom we cannot directly help, a form of spectating (p. 184). She explained that ‘Spectating signifies learned and chosen modes of visual omission and erasure’, implying voyeurism and permitting a gaping distance between self and other (p. 184). Boler (1999) argued that ‘Passive empathy produces no action towards justice but situates the powerful Western eye/I as the judging subject, never called upon to cast her gaze at her own reflection’ (p. 161). Inhabiting a position of distance and separation, like remaining in the ‘anonymous’ spectating crowd, signifies a privilege. Passive empathy satisfies only the most benign educational leadership agenda.

Witnessing, in contrast to spectating, does not fall into easy identification. It is a process through which we undertake our historical responsibilities and co-implications and in which we do not have the luxury of seeing a static truth or fixed certainty (p. 186). In this form of testimonial reading the responsibility is borne by the reader to recognize himself/herself as implicated in the social forces that create the climate of obstacles the other must confront. Judging ‘what others need in order to flourish’ is an exceptionally complicated task not easily assumed in our cultures of difference. Unlike passive empathy, testimonial reading requires a self-reflective participation involving the active task of challenging one’s own assumptions and world views.

Boler’s call for witnessing instead of spectating is situated within a greater need for new conceptions of the relations of emotions and power. As we have developed alternatives to privatized and naturalized models of emotion Boler (1999) offered two concepts of the analysis of emotion and power relations: ‘economies of mind’, which refers to emotion and affect as models of currency in social relations; and, as an alternative to psychological theories of the unconscious, she suggested we consider emotions as ‘inscribed habits of inattention’.

Boler’s work (1999) might productively be drawn upon to extend Hargreaves’ concept of emotional understanding. Her focus on emotions as ‘inscribed habits of inattention’ and emotions as a site of social control inscribes into a foundational conception of emotion their cultural and social embeddedness. Inscribed habits of inattention offers a dimension missing in the notion of emotional understanding, namely that the question of how we do or do not understand the ‘other’ has centrally to do with how we have internalized and, hence, enact culturally learned modes of attention and inattention. For example, a person of privilege need not attend to or notice the discomfort of someone from a marginalized cultural background. So, for example, all of the instances of interviews with teachers about their emotional experience and perception of students in the work under discussion would benefit from an analysis of how teacher’s perceptions of students are informed by their own culturally learned habits of inattention. In a related sense, teacher’s emotional responses to ‘change’ might fruitfully be analysed in terms of when and how teacher’s are given public opportunities to analyse the phenomenon of power and hegemony that structures schools as institutions.
We can also draw on Boler’s (1999) concept of ‘economies of mind’ to describe how Hargreaves ‘emotional geographies’ are effects of power that become an embodied part of our material, everyday existence. Hargreaves uses elementary and secondary teachers’ individual self-assessments of their emotional experiences concerning teacher–parent interactions to describe five forms of emotional distance and closeness that can threaten emotional understanding among teachers, students, colleagues and parents. ‘Socio-cultural distance’ is one of the five key emotional geographies. He explained that:

All too often, teachers look at students and parents with growing incomprehension. They are physically, socially and culturally removed from the communities in which they teach and do not know where parents and students are coming from. This socio-cultural distance often leads teachers to stereotype and to be stereotyped by the communities they serve. (p. 1062)

Hargreaves (2001) described how teacher’s self-reported, individual emotional episodes often contain assumptions and expectations about parental interest and support that are socio-culturally biased, ‘misconstruing problems of poverty as problems of single motherhood or poor parenting generally’ (p. 1063). Teachers also viewed parents’ failure to attend meetings or other officially organized events as failure to support their children or the school. Others measured ‘parenting or “sensitive mothering” of young children against a yardstick of practice that is culturally skewed towards white middle-class norms’ (p. 1063). Hargreaves explained that:

Teachers’ perceptions that parents did not care for their children provoked responses of incredulity, hopelessness, and even disgust among them. There was a difference, an otherness about these parents that teachers found hard to understand… The sociocultural distance between them seemed just too great… Strangeness or ‘otherness’ arises out of complex interactions between difference and distance. Stereotyping and stigmatization often occur where actually interactions between culturally different groups are infrequent or superficial… (pp. 1063–1064)

Notice, however, that Hargreaves’ theory allows for an analysis that can easily overlook issues of power, dominance and subordination, by shifting from the social interpersonal world of the teacher to the mental, intra-individual one (Maracek 1995: 108–109). Jeanne Maracek (1995) noted that this shift is characteristic of psychology. She explained that ‘This slide from the social and interpersonal to the mental could occur without notice because it is a move that takes place over and over in psychological theorizing’ (p. 109). This shift is evident in some of the conclusions drawn; for example, in the following statement: ‘Teachers’ attributions of “otherness” to seemingly difficult parents can therefore result from poor knowledge or presumptuousness on their part’ (Hargreaves 2001: 1065).

Hargreaves (2001) made a similar observation of what he saw as the tendency of service workers’ and ‘caring’ professionals to blame and complain about their clients (p. 1065). He explained that this tendency can result from feelings of powerlessness and helplessness—‘often referred to as low senses of self-efficacy’ (p. 1065):

Here, ‘othering’ is a way of coming to terms with a felt inability to make a difference in clients’ lives—blaming clients themselves for any failure to respond. Blame, in other words, frequently results from a suppressed sense of guilt or shame about being unable to fulfill one’s job or calling and to care for one’s clients sufficiently. (p. 1065)
Yet such a focus on self-concept as the locus of emotional experience ignores the ways in which emotions are ‘a structuring principle of ongoing social relations in nearly every setting and institution in our society’ (Maracek 1995: 109). One can thus see that the theory employed in this analysis tacitly posits a pre-existing ‘true self’ independent of the emotional geographies that consist of a dynamic and complex matrix of social institutions and ongoing relationships in which teachers are embedded. The empirical/psychological model, by focusing on self-conceptions and emphasizing individual emotional experience as primary, lends to an analysis that makes individuals blameworthy for their emotional ‘episodes’ (Hargreaves 2001: 1063), thereby failing to fully take account of the role of the culture and institutional structure that generates emotional geographies. This shortcoming promotes the view that individuals are, to borrow Jeanne Maracek’s phrasing, constricted by emotional geographies, rather than constructed by a social, political and cultural space (Maracek 1995: 108–111).

Boler’s concept of economies of mind can be used to understand how emotional geographies are lived relations of power manifested in terms of emotions and structures of feeling. Economies of mind imply ‘exchange’ and currency or commodity, referring to both the subject produced by knowledge and the knowledge produced by a self.

Economies of mind allows us to analyse how material space and place shape human emotional experience and vice versa, drawing on Foucault’s two methodological innovations of the archaeology and genealogy of power. Boler (1999) explained that:

Archaeology describes a way to analyze the discourses that subject individuals to the internalization of capitalist and patriarchal power, values, and ideologies. Genealogy describes how we can glimpse resistances to this subjectification: At the same time as discourses of discipline and control emerge, the subjects of power also are able to develop ‘subjugated knowledges’ and thus resist and transform power. (p. 20)

Boler’s (1999) concept of economies of mind assumes that power is a non-monolithic, dynamic flux that thrives within social relations (p. 20). This definition of power resonates with Foucault’s (1979, 1990) conception of power. Foucault argued, in part four of The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, that the nature, form and unity of power has been commonly misunderstood (Foucault 1990: 92). His point was that most of us think that power is something that someone holds over us. The early women’s movement and the early civil rights movement are based on this traditional understanding of power as hierarchical, a strength that people and institutions are endowed with and the powerless need to claim. Foucault argued that power is nothing like this because power is ‘a complex strategical situation in a particular society’ (p. 93).

Power has no central point for Foucault, since it is ‘a multiplicity of force relations’ (Foucault 1990: 92). We cannot point to who holds the power because power ‘is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another’ (p. 93) between our schools, religious institutions, corporations, financial institutions, families, and so on. Thus, power is not hierarchical and cannot be something that is ‘acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip
away’, since power is exercised from innumerable points (p. 94). It has a directly ‘productive role’ (p. 94) and it is immanent in other types of relationships, such as economic processes, knowledge relationships and sexual relations. It is ‘the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable’ (pp. 92–93). Power, insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert and self-producing, is simply the overall effect that emerges from all these mobilities.

Boler uses an archaeology and genealogy of power as methods for understanding how these lived relations of power manifest in terms of emotions and structures of feeling. Economies of mind describes an archaeology of our supposedly ‘private’ instances of our feelings that, in turn, reveal the more dispersed and ‘global’ effects of power that these discourses of emotion serve (Boler 1999: 21). Examining emotional experience through different genealogical lenses includes mapping learned ways of seeing, our own particular investments and disinvestments and the emotions that motivate a person to change and which also make change discomforting and something to be resisted. Boler’s emphasis on the ‘global’ pushes us to think of emotions, and ‘choices’, not as residing within the individual but as a mediating space: ‘emotions are a medium, a space in which differences and ethics are communicated, negotiated, and shaped’ (p. 21). Thus, Boler’s economies of mind helps us to understand that emotions are embedded in culture and ideology and embodied and situated in lived relations of power.

Emotions as collaboratively formed

Research on emotions and educational leadership could benefit from turning to feminist philosophies of emotion that study the ways in which emotions are collaboratively formed to understand how economies of mind function. The works of Sandra Bartky and Sue Campbell show how emotions are formed within collaborative social contexts that cannot be reduced to private, individualized expressions of emotion or to simply rational/irrational experiences.

Bartky (1990) demonstrated that womens’ experience of ‘shame’ reflects an emotion that is neither rational nor irrational. Bartky described women’s belief in their unworthiness as ‘a pervasive affective attunement’ (p. 97), what Boler (1997) called ‘engendered attunements’ (p. 224). Bartky made use of Heidegger’s (1962) concept of ‘attunements’. Heidegger suggested that human beings are a priori necessarily attuned to their worlds and environments in the form of moods, rendering all human situations fundamentally en-mooded. Brent Dean Robbins (1999) explained that “Heidegger’s understanding of ‘mood’ is a departure, in this sense, from the everyday understanding of ‘mood’ as in, for example, the ‘affect of an emotion’. Mood as befindlichkeit is a ‘self-finding’ (p. 3). Claudio Ciborra (2001) aptly explained Heidegger’s use of the concepts ‘moods’ and ‘attunements’:

moods are far from being just private states. They disclose the world; they set the stage for our encounter with the world... When we encounter the world in a situation, certain things, people or circumstances matter. This ‘mattering’ is grounded in one’s affectedness. Hence affectedness
discloses the world as a threat, boring or exciting… In other words, our being open and encountering the world, our being amidst people and circumstances… are constituted within a fundamental attunement, the mood. (p. 7, original emphasis)

Bartky analysed the emotion of shame and gender as it arises in a classroom context, where she noticed that when handing in papers her mature female students’ demeanor and words consistently expressed shame over their work. She wrote ‘My students felt inadequate without really believing themselves to be inadequate in the salient respects: They sense something inferior about themselves without believing themselves to be generally inferior at all’ (Bartky 1990: 93). She concluded:

In sum, then, the ‘feelings’ and ‘sensings’ that go to make up women’s shame… do not reach a state of clarity we can dignify as belief. For all that they are profoundly disclosive of women’s ‘Being-in-the-world,’ far more so than many of the fully formed beliefs women hold… such as… that they enjoy like men ‘equality of opportunity’ or that the school or workplace is meritocratic in character. What gets grasped in the having of such feelings… [is] nothing less than women’s subordinate status in a hierarchy of gender, their situation not in ideology but in the social formation as it is actually constituted. (p. 95, emphasis added)

Bartky was critiquing Marxist explanations of ideology and accounts of ‘false consciousness’ by emphasizing instances in which women hold contradictory beliefs about their inferiority. But she did not invoke a theory of the unconscious. Instead, she pointed out that the rhetoric of equality that is now part of dominant ideology does not account for the ways that shame is constituted through social formation. Yet she also refuted analytical and conceptual philosophical theories of emotion, showing that they cannot account for shame’s persistence: even if there is no evidence on which to found a belief that I am inferior, I can feel ashamed. Most importantly for a political theory of emotions, Bartky demonstrated that shame is not an idiosyncratic or an individualized phenomenon, but is socially formed.

Like Bartky, Sue Campbell elaborated a framework that holds emotional expressions to be concretely situated particular historical relationships. Campbell’s (1994) essay ‘Being dismissed: the politics of emotional expression’ shows how bitterness is collaboratively formed. Bitterness is usually viewed as an ‘undesirable’ emotion that should be avoided. Campbell built on recent feminist philosophical analyses of bitterness that had reclaimed bitterness as a ‘legitimate and rational’ response to injustice or oppression (McFall 1991). Campbell critiqued this rationalist language on the grounds that to argue that the bitter person has ‘legitimate and rational reasons’ for her feeling thrusts the ‘burden of justification’ onto the bitter individual. Rather than reinscribe the rational individual, Campbell demonstrated how bitterness is collaboratively formed. She argued that bitterness is not first privately formed before being revealed to others, it is more often publicly formed (Campbell 1994: 48). Boler (1999) explained that:

it’s not that you knew you felt bitter, and then happened to decide to express it. Rather, you expressed your anger and then were told, ‘You’re just bitter.’ Once accused of bitterness, you must justify your reasons. Further, she argues, to be told ‘you’re bitter’ is a dismissal and a silencing. Even if you then articulate your reasons for being bitter, the other is no longer listening. If, instead, we recognize that bitterness is collaboratively and publicly formed, it does not make sense to
Building on Marilyn Frye’s (1983) concept of ‘social uptake’, Campbell discussed the ‘blocking’ or ‘dismissal’ of emotions. These are instances of the enforcement of the culturally condoned habits of inattention. “Social uptake” is defined as necessary to the success of emotions’ (Campbell 1994: 480). Social uptake can be illustrated by a woman who gets angry watching her mechanic mess up the successful adjustment she herself had made to her carburetor. When she then expresses her anger he calls her a ‘crazy bitch’ and changes the subject. Not only does he refuse to ‘uptake’ her anger, but he displaces it and depicts her as crazy. Her emotional expression is successfully ‘blocked’ through this social interaction.

In sum, Bartky showed how emotions are not idiosyncratic or an individualized phenomenon, but are, in part, collaboratively formed through ‘social uptake’ and ‘blocking’.

Conclusions

What we have tried to offer is a productive discussion of how analyses of power and cultural difference can be placed more centrally in the foreground of research into the area of emotions and education. It is only by foregrounding relations of power that define emotional experience and communication that new research can resist the tendency to individualize or universalize emotional experiences. It is not enough that educational leaders show consideration for emotions and their social and organizational dimension. Within education, as in the wider culture, emotions are a site of control and a mode of political resistance. Emotion matters in educational leadership because leaders, teachers and learners understand and enact their roles of subordination and domination significantly through learned emotional expressions and silences. Furthermore, emotions are a basis of collective and individual social resistances to injustices. The maps we use to negotiate emotional terrain and social change are defined and shaped by our relation to language and discourse, which is inevitably about power and privilege. Who speaks? Who names? Whose emotional map defines or excludes the other’s experience? These questions can productively guide not only what we study, but how we orient ourselves to the role of emotions and inscribed habits of [in]attention that shape educational theories, institutions and practices.

One of the primary challenges faced as we develop new conceptual frameworks for understanding the dynamics of emotion in their full social and political context is that the dominant cultural languages and conceptual apparatuses we have inherited tend to reinscribe binaries. Such language reinscribes, perhaps unintentionally, the notion that emotions are in some instances merely a personal experience. Instead, it is crucial that analyses of emotion begin with their socio-cultural contexts. Along these lines, it can also be misleading if one does not suggest from the outset how and why emotions involve political and socio-cultural distance. The reason these are
crucial as foundational frameworks is because dominant cultural discourses too easily allow us to slip into a discussion of emotions that allows us to isolate them from the cultural and hegemonic shaping within social and power hierarchies that we embody and enact. The political and sociocultural dimensions of emotional geographies, in short, must be foregrounded in our analyses of educational theory and practice, and it is important not to indicate that theses are one of many optional ‘add-on’ aspects of a framework.

References


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